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It is not possible to achieve the main goal of the Lisbon Strategy, i.e. to make the 
European Union the most competitive economy in the world, without the single and safe 
financial market, which would guarantee the efficient operation of capital allocation 
mechanisms. Thus, the integration and development of financial markets is a condition 
precedent for the efficient execution of the Lisbon Strategy, described in a detailed way in the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). It was presented in May of 1999 by the European 
Commission2 and it comprises four strategic goals: 
1. To establish the single wholesale capital market. It is the most urgent and ambitious part 
the purpose of which is to establish commonly binding legal regulations in the securities 
and derivatives market stimulating cross-border mergers and acquisitions and creating 
the single market for investors.  
2. To establish the open and safe retail market. Here, important elements are new 
regulations related to so called remote sales of financial services, the protection of 
consumer’s rights in the credit market and the simplification of cross-border 
transactions for retail customers.  
3. To establish modern prudence regulations and the system of financial market 
supervision.  
4. To reduce differences in tax systems and corporate governance. The problem of tax on 
savings earned by non-residents is an especially controversial issue.  
During the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon, it was decided that the 
liberalisation process in the financial service market was too slow and some accelerating 
actions would have to be taken. The action plan for financial markets is to be executed by the 
end of 2005.  
                                                          
1 This publication is a fragment of research and analysis of the Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics carried 
out under the Polish Forum for the Lisbon Strategy.  
2 In July 2000, the team of experts chaired by A. Lamfalussy was established to develop a report on possibilities 
of handling changes in the European securities market based on the existing regulatory mechanisms and to 
prepare changes to the system. Pursuant to the report recommendations, a year later, i.e. in July 2001, the 
European Commission established:  
• European Securities Committee (ESC) composed of representatives of Member states whose task was to 
consult new legal acts, and, having obtained adequate authorisations from the EU Council and Parliament, to 
adopt technical regulations related to securities markets,  
• Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), independent advisory body composed of 
representatives of the national regulatory bodies, whose task is to provide the European Commission with 
consultation related to technical regulation adoption and to co-ordinate their implementation.  
At present, the work is being carried out to establish similar procedures and regulatory institutions for each 
financial sector, including banking, insurance, pension funds and financial conglomerates. Then, the actions 
taken to establish the uniform financial market should focus on establishing institutions guaranteeing the 
efficient enforcement of regulations and protecting investors, customers and policy holders.  
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It was assumed that an optimum way to increase the value of financial systems for 
European citizens, business and society, as regards the sustainable and balanced economic 
growth and the creation of new workplaces, was the integration of financial markets.  
Estimated economic benefits from the integration and liberalisation of financial 
markets are as follows3: 
• the unification of the securities market and enhancement of procedures for entering this 
market may bring about the GDP growth by 1.1% in EU, as well as the growth of total 
headcount by 0.5%,  
• the single clearing infrastructure will reduce costs of transfers by 42%-52%, 
• the integration of the retail financial market consisting in interest rate lowering may bring 
about estimated benefits of 0.7% of GDP in EU,  
• the unification of the consumer credit market could generate savings to consumers not 
smaller than 41% of the credit price,  
• international mergers and acquisitions could result in the reduction of operating costs by 
more than 1.2% - 1.3%, 
• the liquidation of „ineffectiveness” in the banking sector may result in GDP of 1.4% - 
1.6% via capital costs reduction. 
The empirical research on consumer prices in the Eurozone and real effects of mergers 
and acquisitions shows that the above assumptions are too optimistic4. 
Every year, in the first quarter before the meeting of the European Commission, 
reports on the Lisbon Strategy progress, including the FSAP implementation schedule, are 
presented.   
The seventh report (Brussels, 3.12.2002) on the FSAP implementation evaluates the 
progress in increasing economic competitiveness as lower than expected. It states that till the 
end of the Dutch presidency, 31 of 42 FSAP goals were implemented, and their legislative 
adaptation was generally well evaluated. The report of January 14, 20035 observes that only 6 
of 8 priority goals planned for 2002 were fully completed. Apart from legislation goals, FSAP 
also comprises auxiliary initiatives, so called various types of analytic and consultation work 
(mainly communications), which are the base for legislative proposals, and so called 
recommendations, i.e. non-obligatory guidelines (e.g. recommendations on audit 
independence).  
Most important initiatives under FSAP have already been implemented in the form of 
directives or recommendations, including especially regulations related to: international 
accounting standards, free investment institutions, independence of auditors and market 
overuse. The most important areas related to the establishment of the single financial market 
remain, however, open. Furthermore, FSAP has to be completed in the light of the European 
Union enlargement. As regards the financial market integration, directives on issue 
prospectuses and investment services have not been finally agreed. A subsequent report on 
FSAP implementation is likely to be published in the middle of 2003.  
                                                          
3 London Economics study for DG International market IVIE; following: Financial Services, Seventh Report 
3.12.2002. 
4 See: S. Kleimeier, H. Sander, Consumer Credit Rates in the Eurozone. Evidence on the Emergence of a Single 
Retail Banking Market, ECRI Research Report No. 2, January 2002. 
5 Implementation Report on „2002 Review of the Internal Strategy – Delivering the Promise”, Brussels 
14.01.2003.  
 2
It has been confirmed that there is a will to implement effectively:  
• the whole Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) by the end of 2005  
• FSAP’s tasks related to securities markets and the Risk Capital Action Plan (RCAP) by 
the end of 2003. 
If the tasks related to the securities market and RCAP were implemented as intended 
in 2003, it would mean that Poland would not have any formal influence on the present shape 
of those regulations. In the case of RCAP, they refer to financial support for innovative 
projects, including especially SMEs and mainly based on venture capital funds. We do not 
need to justify the significance of these issues for the execution of the National Development 
Plan and for the unemployment reduction.  
The concept of the single financial market in EU is, undoubtedly, a very important 
factor stimulating economic development, mainly via more effective capital allocation. It is 
consistent with the interest of each Member State, including Poland, since it lets achieve the 
competitive advantage of the whole system. Beneficiaries of the financial market integration 
will be, however, various states to various extent. For example, the estimated average growth 
of GDP by 1.1% as a result of the capital cost reduction in the single financial market is likely 
to be significantly diversified. Expected benefits for the existing Member States are presented 
in chart 1.  
Chart 1. Expected long-term benefits from the financial market integration in particular 
states of the European Union  

















Source:  London Economics and Oxford Economic Forecasting after: N. Walter, Make financial markets a 
driving force in the EU economy, w EU Monitor. Reports on European integration, No. 1. April 2003 
 
A basic condition to gain some benefits from the liberalisation and integration of 
financial markets is, however, the stability of financial systems. The liberalisation and 
integration of financial markets without a new financial architecture, including its  
integrated supervision, increases the risk of global financial crisis.  
 3
The Polish banking market is already, at present, a liberalised market. The market 
integration is a result of market processes, mostly connected with strategies of international 
holdings, as well as processes of mergers and acquisitions carried out by strategic investors. 
The banking market is actually prepared to the complete integration as understood by the 
Lisbon Strategy and no special protective policy is required.  
The regulations on banking supervision seem to be not worse than in most EU states. 
They are influenced by the Basil Committee’s standards. The banking supervision practice is 
moderately protectionistic (knowledge of language, outsourcing, etc.) and the banking system 
monitoring is more and more professional.  
A characteristic feature distinguishing the Polish financial system from financial systems of 
the EU Member States is a great share of foreign capital in the net worth of financial 
institutions. Around 70% of assets of commercial banks in Poland are controlled by foreign 
capital, and most Polish commercial banks are dependant companies of international holdings. 
Apart from unquestionable benefits of such a situation (non-political system, know-how take-
over, capital contributions, etc.), there may appear some threats that should be minimised by 
improving solutions, constructing the new global financial architecture and executing the 
Lisbon Strategy.  
The threats refer to consequences of the dominant company’s behaviour in 
relation to its dependant entity in the case of a crisis.  
It is connected with competencies and responsibility of the host state’s supervision and the 
mother state’s supervision, including the consolidation of supervisory functions and deposit 
guarantee systems in particular states. These issues were partially discussed by the Basil 
Committee and there are some proposals of actions related to cross-border banking 
supervision6. These proposals do not seem, however, sufficient to reduce significantly the risk 
of loss nationalisation in the states being the seat of dependant companies if benefits resulting 
from the financial market integration are internationalised. The problem of loss 
nationalisation and benefit internationalisation refers mainly to states that are subject to 
system transformation and run liberal policy supporting the financial market integration, i.e. 
especially Poland, Hungary and Estonia.  
The existing proposals of regulations related thereto were, obviously, influenced by 
the countries of capital exporters, thus cross-border banking supervision standards included 
mainly the mother country’s risk. The consolidated supervision is treated as a duty and 
responsibility of a supervisory institution of a mother country, whereas local supervisory 
institutions are practically obliged to provide information. However, it is admitted that the 
information should flow in two directions (between local and mother supervisory institutions) 
and that all cross-border bank operations should be effectively supervised7 by mother and 
local supervisory institutions, but such a principle is not fully reflected in 
recommendations made. It refers especially to possibilities of identifying the risk generated 
by an international capital group in relation to its dependant company. The Basil Committee 
confirms that these are „very delicate issues for mother supervisory institutions (both as 
regards their content and time) and decisions on obligatory information transfer will have to 
                                                          
6 See: Supervision of cross-border banking, 27/1996 
           Core principles for effective banking supervision, 30/1997 
7 Effective consolidated supervision is based on three principles:  
• no banking activity, regardless of its location, should avoid supervision,  
• no multiple capital leverage is allowed,  
• guarantee that all types of risks the bank group is subject to, regardless of the place where they are booked, 
are evaluated and controlled globally.  
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be made separately in each single case"8. Such an approach does not allow local supervisory 
bodies to monitor the financial standing of strategic investors, which may be a threat to 
domestic banks’ stability in the case of any financial perturbation within international 
holdings.  
It should be pointed out that, apart from threats for capital providers and the stability 
of the banking system in the dominant company’s country, there is also a risk for depositors in 
the country where dependant companies run their activity. This is a risk that, in our opinion, is 
not adequately reflected in proposed regulations. The risk of depositors losing their savings is 
insured by local deposit guarantee institutions. They, and not regulatory institutions from the 
supervisor’s state, bear an actual responsibility for destabilising local financial systems. We 
are not against suggested new regulations on consolidated supervision (in a horizontal sense, 
covering the supervision over financial conglomerates and in a vertical sense, covering cross-
border supervision), but we have to ask a fundamental question: are there any objective 
conditions for the single European financial market concept not to comprise a principle of 
complete integration of regulatory (supervisory) institutions, which would be, for sure, 
connected with establishing an international supervisory body?  
At present, the activeness of the Polish banking supervision should be bigger and a 
pressure to conclude agreements with bank supervisory bodies of countries where strategic 
investors come from should be stronger to allow for monitoring the security of capital groups 
where Polish banks are dependant companies. Barriers are the said „non-partner” solutions 
proposed by banking supervisory bodies from the countries where dominant companies have 
their seats.  
Thus, the international integration of supervisory institutions is of key importance for 
the stability of the Polish banking system. At present, local supervisors and their operating 
methods are different as regards institutional, legal and historic factors, that is why it was 
decided that international banks were supervised by their mother supervisory institution. 
However, the integration of financial markets will cause that these factors will be less and less 
important. It is the interest of Poland, a host country for many companies dependant on 
international banks, to promote the concept of the complete international integration of 
institutions supervising financial markets. Although the integrated supervision is believed 
to be an optimum solution, there appears an opinion that „the single supervisory body is not 
likely to be established due to a political will to maintain the national character of financial 
sectors”9. The national character of financial sectors is against the concept of the financial 
market integration being the base of the Lisbon Strategy.  
The condition (consequence) of the integrated supervision should be the 
establishment of international deposit guaranteeing institutions in the international 
financial holdings. The goal is to eliminate the risk of loss nationalisation accompanying the 
process of benefit internationalisation with the integration of financial markets. Thus, the 
integration of deposit guaranteeing institutions seems to be a logic consequence of free capital 
flow (including deposits) and eliminates unhealthy auction as regards legal guarantees offered 
to bank customers.  
Generally speaking, the countries where dependant companies, being parts of 
international holdings, prevail in the banking system are interested in introducing the concept 
of international integrated supervision. The goal would be to reduce threats for a dependant 
company resulting from financial perturbations in the capital group, and especially in the 
                                                          
8 Supervision of cross-border banking p. 30 
9 M. Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Safety of the Polish banking sector in the European banking market in the light of 
new prudence regulations, copy, IBnGR Gdańsk 2003 . 
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dominant company. The existing regulations are mainly a result of care for shareholder’s 
interests and the financial stability of the country where the dominant company’s seat is 
located, thus fear against risk generated by dependant companies. The reduction of the 
dominant company’s risk down to the level of equity contributed by it discriminates the 
countries where banks being dependant companies operate. It is a risk for depositors and tax 
payers of the countries where dependant companies run their activity.  
Thus, Poland is justified to promote the concept of the complete vertical integration of 
institutions supervising international holdings. The national banking supervision should be 
fully liable only for the activity of national financial institutions that are not dependant 
companies, thus especially for PKO BP SA, BGŻ SA, BGK and co-operative banks. Such a 
solution would depend on the international deposit guarantee institution or the guaranteeing 
institution from the dominant company’s mother country taking over responsibility towards 
depositors. Whereas, in the case of banks being dependant companies, it could perform 
supervisory functions on behalf and to the benefit of the international supervisory institution.   
The financial market integration entails the integration of prudence regulations. 
However, FSAP’s proposals miss single standards for establishing specific provisions by 
banks. The lack of such standards favours dishonest competition between banks. Always in 
such a situation, restrictive systems would replace safer, although more protective, systems.  It 
is the interest of Poland and the European Union to introduce uniform standards for 
establishing specific provisions quickly, and to unify tax consequences for banks resulting 
therefrom.  
 
Summing up, the integration of the banking market in the European Union will 
generate the effects of synergy provided that regulations supporting honest competition are 
established. It requires especially:  
1) the international integration of supervision, strengthening especially the stability of 
banking systems in countries where dependant companies prevail,  
2) the uniform prudence rules with the uniform standards for establishing of and paying 
taxes on specific provisions,  
3) the integrated deposit guarantee system,  
4) the uniform system for savings income taxation, which would eliminate the risk of 
savings outflow from the European Union.  
The existing directives and draft directives under FSAP do not guarantee that the 
above conditions will be met. Poland should be interested in precisely analysing consequences 
resulting from violating principles of honest competition in the said areas for particular 
countries in the European Union, as well as the whole group in order to find advocates to 
support its further initiative.  
To execute the idea of the single financial market of the European Union reinforcing 
the competitive position of the whole Community and particular Member States, the existing 
action plan has to be expanded and completed. We are convinced that Poland should actively 
participate in:  
• finalising the implementation of FSAP, 
• establishing the single regulatory and supervisory infrastructure, 
• improving the operation of the single financial market (under post-FSAP). 
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